



Michael	Ruse:	The	Gaia	Hypothesis:	Science	on	a	Pagan	Planet.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2013,	265	pp.,	ISBN	9780226731704	(hdbk)	$26.00	£18.00			 Many	analysts	have	been	puzzled	about	the	meaning	of	the	Gaia	hypothesis.	While	over	the	past	decades	several	scientific	conferences	have	been	organised	which	made	reference	to	“the	Gaia	hypothesis”,	it	has	long	been	clear	that	there	is	no	agreement	on	its	contents.	Should	one	focus	on	its	teleological	version,	which	states	that	the	biosphere	maintains	homeostasis	of	its	environment	“by	and	for	itself”	(in	some	sense)?	Or	on	the	even	stronger	optimising	version,	which	specifies	in	addition	that	the	environment	is	manipulated	to	be	optimal	for	the	biota?	Both	versions	of	the	Gaia	hypothesis	are	difficult	to	engage	with	for	scientists,	however,	since	they	are	not	scientific	hypotheses:	they	are	of	a	metaphysical	character.		 Alternatively,	instead	of	focusing	on	these	metaphysical	versions,	one	could	focus	on	the	homeostatic	version	without	teleology,	which	maintains	that	the	biota	influence	the	environment	in	a	way	that	causes	a	homeostasis	in	the	face	of	a	changing	external	forcing	(e.g.,	keeping	a	planet’s	temperature	relatively	constant	under	significantly	increasing	solar	forcing,	typically	over	geological	timescales	of	hundreds	of	millions	to	billions	of	years).	Testing	such	a	hypothesis	is	not	a	straightforward	matter,	but	at	least	it	is	a	version	of	the	Gaia	hypothesis	that	is	scientifically	interesting.	It	is	more	interesting	at	least	than	weaker	versions	of	the	Gaia	hypothesis,	which	merely	describe	the	well-established	fact	in	Earth	system	science	that	the	biota	and	the	abiotic	world	are	strongly	coupled.		 In	The	Gaia	Hypothesis	by	the	acclaimed	philosopher	of	science	Michael	Ruse,	the	genesis,	evolution	and	reception	of	the	Gaia	hypothesis	as	it	was	put	forward,	defended	and	refined	by	the	inventor	and	independent	scientist	James	Lovelock	and	his	co-worker	in	the	1970s,	the	biologist	Lynn	Margulis	(who	later	became	famous	for	her	work	on	symbiosis),	is	carefully	documented.	Ruse	shows	that	while	Lovelock	and	his	supporters	have	consistently	tried	to	accommodate	scientific	criticism	of	the	Gaia	hypothesis	by	seemingly	getting	rid	of	the	metaphysical	versions,	the	attractiveness	of	the	Gaia	hypothesis	for	the	general	public	remained	precisely	what	Lovelock	exclaimed	to	Ruse	when	he	spoke	about	the	Earth	as	Gaia	in	his	interview	in	2011:	“It	is	most	certainly	an	organism—and	alive!”	(p.	224).		 Within	scientific	circles,	“over	the	years	Lovelock	and	his	supporters	had	striven	to	cleanse	Gaia	of	its	crudest	teleological	excesses	and	other	offensive	features”	(p.	217).	But,	as	Ruse	interestingly	argues,	even	while	the	Gaia	hypothesis	(not	the	metaphysical	versions)	had	by	the	end	of	the	twentieth	century	achieved	some	degree	of	scientific	acceptance,	there	were	also	external	reasons	why	‘critics	no	longer	felt	the	need	to	cry	“pseudoscience”’	(pp.	217–218).	In	particular	“the	
status	of	evolutionary	biology	was	much	more	secure	than	it	had	been	twenty	years	previously”	(p.	218).		One	of	the	added	values	that	we	had	Ruse	write	this	definitive	history	of	the	Gaia	hypothesis	is	that	he	is	so	well	versed	in	the	history	and	philosophy	of	evolutionary	biology	and	in	the	history	of	ideas.	He	is	therefore	able	to	offer,	in	the	middle	of	his	book	(after	a	chapter	on	Plato,	Platonism	and	Naturphilosophie),	three	rich	chapters	on	“mechanism”	(focusing	on	the	reductive	nature	of	evolutionary	biology	and	its	precursors	in	philosophy	of	nature),	“organicism”	(highlighting	the	holistic	nature	of	much	ecology)	and	“hylozoism”	(turning	to	some	recent	thinkers	who	have	accepted	that	the	world	is	living)	that	help	resolve	the	paradox	that	plays	a	central	role	in	Ruse’s	story:	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	there	were	simultaneous	but	opposite	reactions	to	the	Gaia	hypothesis	in	science	and	among	the	general	public:	biologists	reacted	very	negatively	while	there	was	an	enthusiastic	reception	by	the	general	public,	especially	in	America.	In	the	early	1980s,	as	Ruse	indicates,	“[e]volutionary	biologists	were	tearing	themselves	apart”	(p.	210)	and	were	also	under	attack	from	outside	(partly	a	broad	public	reaction	to	the	“selfish	gene”	metaphor	but	also,	more	narrowly,	a	different	attack	from	conservative	evangelical	Christians	calling	themselves	“creationists”).	“So	when	Gaia	came	bumbling	in,	it	was	seen	as	not	just	wrong	but	radically	upsetting”	(p.	213).	The	Gaia	hypothesis	was	wrong	because	among	other	things	it	ignored	the	individual–group	barrier	and	it	used	teleological	language.	And	it	was	upsetting	since	“[a]bove	all,	it	was	associated	with	social	and	religious	beliefs	that	were	anathema	to	all	evolutionists”	(p.	214).		As	Ruse	shows,	these	beliefs	relate	to	hylozoism,	“a	tradition	of	thinking	about	the	world	and	its	environment	that	was	especially	strong	in	America,	going	back	to	the	transcendentalists”	(p.	198).	American	transcendentalism	is	a	philosophy	that	was	popular	at	the	end	of	the	19th	century	and	is	described	in	Ruse’s	chapter	on	“organicism”.	Ruse	does	qualify	the	“generality”	of	the	public	that	was	enthusiast	about	the	Gaia	hypothesis.	While	“we	should	not	assume	that	only	people	of	the	more	extreme	left	or	radical	movements	would	welcome	it	.	.	.	the	Gaia	hypothesis	obviously	did	and	still	does	on	balance	appeal	more	to	those	challenging	conventional	norms”	(p.	200).		 This	book	is	original,	well	researched	(it	also	has	a	basis	in	interviews	with	all	main	protagonists),	timely	(the	hypothesis	seems	to	have	run	out	of	steam)	and	well	written.	Ruse’s	analysis	is	even-handed.	His	final	assessment	is	that	“[f]ailure	as	science	is	balanced	by	success	as	philosophy.	.	.	.	Lovelock	and	Margulis	were	big	people	with	a	big	vision.	Whether	science	likes	it	or	not,	the	vision	lives	on”	(p.	223).	In	short,	The	Gaia	Hypothesis	is	highly	recommended	reading.			
	 Arthur	C.	Petersen	
	 University	College	London		
	
